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VANDERBILT LA W REVIEW
Elliott E. Cheatham: His Contributions to
a Developing Sense of Professional
Responsibility
It may not, after all, be difficult to be a nunc pro tunc prophet,
but it takes real imagination to think of it. Hindsight is quite another
matter; all of us are constantly explaining how a better decision years
ago would have made for a happier world today. But to think in 1947
of assuming oneself to have been prophesying in 1897 as to what
would be the state of affairs fifty years thence reveals an imaginative
gift of some magnitude. Not only does it offer a sure-fire guaranty of
accuracy of prediction, but also it dramatizes the fallibility of a
genuine 1897 prophet who is operating in futuro and not nunc pro
tunc.
Elliott Cheatham, in a mischievous mood, made this all very
clear over twenty years ago. Establishing himself at a point near the
end of Queen Victoria's reign, he proved beyond any reasonable doubt
how incredible then would have been any prediction of what became
the actualities of 1947.1 Not only that, but as recently as 1963 he had
the temerity, with a cei'tain engaging complacency, to glory both in
his achievement and his technique in attaining it 2 But even Achilles is
said to have had a weakness, and so it is with Professor Cheatham's
retroactive prophecies. Never, either in 1947 (as of 1897) or in 1963
(as of 1913), did he predict the position in esteem, admiration, and
affection that he himself would occupy, come 1968. Nor, as a matter
of fact, would his ingenuity have been capable of it, for to have done
so would have been altogether inhibited by the humility that has so
pervaded his every achievement.
His interest in lawyers, their conduct, and their professional
associations is my first concern here. That is an interest that has been
with him for a long, long time. Others will pay full tribute elsewhere
to his contributions in other fields.
It was nearly thirty-five years ago, in speaking of the legal
profession, that he said:
1. Legal Education-Some Predictions, 26 TEXAS L: REV. 174 (1947).
2. The Need for Specialized Legal Services, 16 VAND. L. REV. 497, 499 (1963). This was
further reconfirmed in E. CHEATHAM, A LAWYER WHEN NEEDED 89 (1963).
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We enjoy a law-created monopoly as aids in the performance of functions
that everywhere are essentially governmental; at the same time, we are enlisted in
the private service of the battling elements of a competitive society whose
struggles are often sharp and desperate
And it was only three years ago that he said, in introducing a
symposium on the Canons of Ethics:
We have an extraordinarily difficult position as lawyers today. We have an
adversary system inside of a competitive system, dealing with human beings in a
rapidly changing world.
4
He has, I think, phrased this thought most happily in his statement
that "[t]he American lawyer is a paradox within paradoxes."'
This perception of the place of lawyers in an adversary system set
within a competitive economy has led Elliott Cheatham down two
parallel channels of application-the function of the practitioner and
the function of those who educate him and launch him on his career.
In each, the dominant, the all-commanding thought has been
responsibility, and underlying this responsibility has been service,
service to client and to community.
This appears especially in his discussion years later of what in
1934 he had described as a "law-created monopoly." This was in a
symposium on group legal services, and he was translating into
modern vernacular the words noblesse oblige-translating them as
"privilege brings responsibility."' (the italics are his). No one in all
time has more deeply sensed or more consistently followed that
principle than Elliott Cheatham.
As all the world knows, the most telling expression of his own
sense of this obligation is found in his Carpentier Lectures at
Columbia in 1963. 7 To read these is to realize too that behind the
author's depiction of the needs of the three groups he discusses,
groups that are inadequately provided with legal assistance, is a deep
understanding of and compassion for the needs of human beings. No
mere abstractionist is speaking here, no one coldly evaluating
untapped sources of law business. Quite otherwise, for here is a warm-
3. His review of casebooks by Herschel W. Arant and George P. Costigan, Jr., 47 HARV.
L. REV. 1295, 1296 (1934).
4. Introductory remarks at a round-table discussion on A Re-Evaluation of the Canons of
Ethics, at the Association of American Law Schools Annual Meeting. Chicago, Illinois,
December 29, 1965, reprinted at 33 TENN. L. REV. 129 (1966).
5. A LAWYER WHEN NEEDED 4 (1963).
6. Availability of Legal Services: The Responsibility of the Individual Lawyer and of the
Organized Bar, 12 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 438, 439 (1965).
7. Published as A LAWYER WHEN NEEDED (1963).
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hearted human being who is sensing the unameliorated plight of the
least fortunate among us and directing the attention of lawyers and
bar associations to needs that must not be left unmet.
Unlike many others, he has not confined his concern to the plight
of a single group. "The hated," as he calls them, are not only the
politically unorthodox but include as well members of feared or
despised minorities, even persons accused of the most despicable of
crimes. In expatiating on their needs for counsel, he does not fail to
face frankly the possible costs in public esteem, even clientele, to the
lawyer sensitive enough and brave enough to undertake their
representation.
He deals compassionately with the unhated, and hitherto
unheeded, poor and portrays the shortcomings in legal services
available to them despite a steadily awakening bar. As for persons of
small means, he categorizes them as now the most forgotten of all the
groups.
His concern is more than fact-stating and exposition; it extends
to discussion of ways and means of making services available-legal
aid (both privately and publicly financed), public defenders, and
lawyer referral plans. He speaks at length of the problem of
specialization where even affluent clients have little practical means of
identifying lawyers of special competence We have here, though on
another economic level, a problem of relating client to specialist and,
often too, of the ambiguous part played by the generalist. Here too
are risks that the generalist may lose face by referring the client and
that the client may find himself with two fees to pay. The frank
fashion in which Professor Cheatham faces these risks, even as he has
others, is quiet testimony to the objectivity that qualifies all his
concerns.
This objectivity is particularly clear in his discussion of another
risk-the risk that concentrations of economic power, whether in big
business or in big labor, may impinge on the public interest. Here he
finds a new opportunity for lawyers, for the measure he proposes is
"the limited one of representation of the public interest in the process
by which the two contending powers make their decision. . . .The
mere presence of the public representative may bring about . . .an
8. See note 2 supra. This problem is emphasized in his book, A LAWYER WHEN NEEDED
(1963), and it is of interest that C.P. Harvey, in reviewing it, expressed the view that the separate
functions of solicitor and barrister in England obviated several of the difficulties we face in this
country. 27 MODERN L. REV. 745, 747 (1964). But Professor Cheatham had anticipated this
very comment. See A LAWYER WHEN NEEDED 94 (1963).
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awareness of another dimension of meaning and judgment" [quoting
Reinhold Niebuhr]. "[C]onciliation rather than decision is the wise
method of adjustment. ... '. And good lawyers are good conciliators."
Elsewhere he has spoken of "imagination and resourcefulness," and
the proposal he has made here well illustrates where those qualities
may lead when guided by deep conviction as to the opportunities and
obligations of the lawyer in respect to the public interest.'
Professor Cheatham's contributions to the Boulder Conference of
1956 repeatedly revealed this broad concern. Although at one time he
felt the necessity of explaining why he had, as he believed, so
vigorously emphasized the responsibilities of the lawyer as a private
practitioner,10 as a matter of fact, the views he expressed throughout
the conference revealed his conception of the lawyer in the broadest
frame of reference. Public responsibility, he felt, "imported three
elements: basic values, social processes and the lawyer's relation to
these.""
Nor should his viewpoint as to the responsibilities of the
practicing bar be left without an appreciation of his abiding faith that
they can, and ultimately will, be carried out. Thus he pays tribute to
"a reinvigorated American Bar Association; stronger State bar
associations . .. ; organizations directed to the improvement of the
substantive and procedural law . . . ; judicial conferences, councils
and law revision commissions; the continuing ferment in legal
education . . . ; [and] the long sustained efforts" to provide needed
legal services. 2
In an ultimate sense, his contributions to legal education are also
contributions to the practice of law itself. The law school years shape
the years ahead. Whether the law school years comprise an
inculcation of a perception of the values that constitute a sense of
responsibility is not beyond controversy, but there is no doubt that
Professor Cheatham has firm confidence that they do, and in this I
9. A LAWYER WHEN NEEDED 120, 123 (1963). Vigorous exception has been taken by one
reviewer, a practitioner, to this suggestion; it is "rather far afield from the pressing practical
problems within the direct responsibility of the organized bar." Sykes in 24 MD. L. REV. 224,
228 (1964).
10. He felt it important, he said, to "redress the balance in discussion," since the
conference had been directed principally toward the education of lawyers in public aspects of
their calling. The proceedings of this conference were later edited and substantially recast by
Julius Stone. They were published as J. Stone, LEGAL EDUCATION AND PUBLIC RESPONSIBILITY
(1959). Professor Cheathman's observation is found at 371, in his supplemental statement.
11. Id. at 73.
12. Quoting in part from his review of THE AMERICAN LAWYER by Albert P. Blaustein
and Charles 0. Porter, 4 J. PUB. LAW 170, 173 (1955).
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am happy to endorse him most warmly. He believes that this is a
function that law schools can helpfully perform and that, in fact, such
is their particular obligation.
The initial edition of his Cases on the Legal Profession (1938)
was not the first attempt of law teachers to provide teaching materials
for a separate course,'3 but it has had the most survival value.
Perhaps this is due to what an able reviewer found in it-"a sense of
motion, progress, experimentation, adjustment to social and economic
conditions."' 4 Certainly it is a refreshingly frank approach to the
actual conduct of lawyers, free of what Max Radin called "the solemn
unction and lyric exhaltation of the ardent ministers of a cult."' 5
Moreover, it introduced, to a degree not attempted before, the use of
materials other than court opinions and thereby treated problems not
previously accessible; for example, the lawyer in his office and the
lawyer's relations to legislative bodies.
In his Second Edition (1955), he expanded these materials
markedly and introduced an emphasis on what he called "the
affirmative loyalties of the lawyer, not on the negative restrictions."
His purpose was redirected toward "the development of a sense of
professional responsibility through identification of the individual
lawyer with something beyond himself and his clients." As has
already been noted, this has long been a major emphasis in his
viewpoint, and here it is reflected in discussions of the lawyer as
negotiator and as an activist in law reform, as well as treatment of
the function and objectives of legal education, most pleasingly
adorned by a diverting conversation between "Two Law Students and
a Teacher."
There have been other excellent casebooks in this area, but none
has opened wider the vistas of professional responsibility than Elliott
Cheatham's Cases on the Legal Profession. By virtue of it,
generations of students, now actively in practice, have been exposed to
the information, to the values, to the decision-making, and, above all,
to the opportunities that characterize our profession. They, and the
many teachers who have used it, owe him a lasting debt for the
illumination and guidance this book has provided.
Professor Cheatham's writings, listed elsewhere in this issue, are
too numerous for individual examination here. At least thirty-five
13. Both Costigan's (1917) and Arant's (1933) casebooks were earlier, as was Hick's text,
ORGANIZATION AND ETHICS OF BENCH AND BAR (1932).
14. Bradway, Book Review, 38 COLUM. L. REV. 1134, 1138 (1938).
15. Radin, Book Review, 24 CORNELL L. Q. 462 (1939).
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years ago he was contributing generously, always wisely and helpfully,
to the long lineage of his criticisms, comments, and recommendations
for the educating of law students in a perceptive understanding of their
responsibilities as lawyers. He participated in numerous symposiums,
always striking a note of firm optimism that the schools can in fact
communicate such a perception and insisting that they are obligated to
undertake the effort.
His participation at Boulder in 1956 was characteristic. He
heloed plan the conference, select the agenda, and invite the
participants. The transcript is pervaded with his wise comments. As
Julius Stone well stated, he has "the gift of succinct summation." At
the conclusion of the Boulder Conference a statement was adopted by
consensus; it had been prepared by Professor Cheatham. Its final
paragraph reads:
Too often lawyers accept the standards of their clients where instead they
should be exercising the judgment of an independent calling; where they should
be asserting the freedom to use their high proficiency in the service of their
public as well as their private responsibilities. The law schools have a unique
opportunity and responsibility to transmit, encourage and develop this full sense
of obligation. 6
In concluding, I can do no better than recall the apt
characerization with which Shelden Elliott once ended his book
review. Referring to Elliott Cheatham as a "modest, kindly, strength
of intellect," he spoke of his Cases on the Legal Profession as "a
tribute to those same unique qualities-qualities which have earned
him the respect and affection of the practicing bar, his fellow law
teachers, and his students."' 7 To which I would add only this thought:
that his contribution to the solution of the most baffling of
pedagogical problems-the inculcation of a sense of professional
responsibility in law students, and thereby in practitioners-has not
only been outstanding; it has been unique. His character, his
intellectual stature, the depth and clarity of his convictions, his ideals,
his vision, and his great gift of communication have long set him
apart. Inexperienced though I am as a prophet, I will not hesitate to
predict in all confidence, in futuro and not at all nunc pro tunc, that
the law men of the year 2018 will look back upon him with lasting
appreciation and gratitude.
ROBERT E. MATHEWS*
16. Stone, Supra note 10, at 359.
17. Elliott, Book Review, 4 J. PUB. LAW 447, 451 (1955).
* Professor of Law, University of Texas; Professor Emeritus, Ohio State University.
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